Leaked Records Show Deutsche Bank Courting Russian Oligarchs

When Russian missiles began pummeling Ukraine in February 2022, executives at one of the world’s largest banks sensed trouble headed their way.

Within hours of an invasion that set off a war that is now in its fifth year, Western governments issued new financial sanctions intended to further isolate Russia from the world economy.

At Deutsche Bank, a longtime bank of Russian industry titans and oligarchs, officials scrambled to get ahead of the damage. “Russian Sanctions Urgent Request” read the subject line of an email sent by one of Deutsche’s anti-financial crime specialists to her colleagues.

“As you know we have a large Russian Oligarchs client population” and other clients with investments in Russian companies, she wrote. She asked which of those clients “we potentially could unwind and which not.” Should the bank advise them, she wondered, to withdraw their money “while they still can?”

This email exchange was the beginning of a frenzied reckoning within the scandal-plagued bank over its long resistance to breaking with Russia’s most important business titans under Vladimir V. Putin, the Russian president. The bank’s clients included the Russian billionaires Oleg V. Deripaska and Viktor F. Vekselberg. Time and again over many years, records show, Deutsche Bank’s risk managers warned that such relationships were perilous.

But profits associated with maintaining its Russian clients won out every time.

Russia’s war in Ukraine swept up Deutsche Bank in a larger shift. For decades, German politicians and business leaders believed that working with Russia and deepening economic ties between the two countries would discourage Russian aggression. That strategy collapsed after the invasion.

Deutsche Bank’s response to the sanctions, as well as new details about its long history with Russian clients, emerged from more than 15 million internal records, including confidential reports, emails and meeting minutes. The leaked records were obtained by the Indian author and journalist Josy Joseph and the South African journalist Khadija Sharife and were analyzed by a consortium of more than 200 journalists, including reporters for The New York Times.

The records provide a rare insider narration of Deutsche Bank’s yearslong cultivation of Russian oligarch clients. Those relationships continued even as units within the bank argued that handling the oligarchs’ finances put the bank at risk of inadvertently facilitating financial crimes.

That would be familiar turf for Deutsche. The fallout from Russia’s invasion capped a seven-year period during which Deutsche paid billions of dollars to settle claims by regulators that it had handled transactions for international bribery and money laundering, among other accusations. One of those cases involved the bank’s activities in Russia.

Even with its activities in Russia under scrutiny, Deutsche’s bankers debated how much they were obligated to tell the Justice Department about their Russian clients, records show. And bank executives initially resisted calls to exit the Russian market after the invasion. Only when competitors announced they would depart the Russian market did the bank finally pull up stakes.

Deutsche Bank, in recent written statements responding to questions for this article, said it had acted lawfully and never helped clients evade financial sanctions. “Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Deutsche Bank acted promptly to implement the rapidly evolving sanctions imposed by the relevant authorities,” the bank said.

For Russia’s politically connected ultrarich, Western financial houses like Deutsche Bank were essential. Deutsche Bank gave them the ability to do business in stable currencies and to keep their fortunes immune from Russia’s unpredictable economy and politics. Western bank accounts allowed oligarchs to buy professional sports teams and London mansions.

For years, experts have published research and given testimony before Congress showing that the Kremlin has used oligarchs as an instrument of soft power.

The newly obtained internal reports and emails capture the beginning of the end of Deutsche Bank’s long pursuit of Russian money.

After more than a century of an on-again-off-again presence in Russia, Deutsche Bank had become so ingrained there by 2008 that Mr. Putin spoke glowingly of the bank and personally met with Josef Ackermann, then the chief executive, in Moscow.

“The bank serves as a bridge between the Russian and German economies,” Mr. Putin said during the meeting.

Deutsche Bank had built a substantial clientele of oligarchs, the businesspeople who turned Kremlin connections into riches when state resources were parceled out after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Inside Deutsche Bank, some sounded warnings about these relationships — starting what would become a secret but defining pattern over the next decade and a half.

In 2014, the bank’s internal committee on reputational risk ranked its oligarch clients by the potential danger each posed to the bank’s image. At the top of the list was Mr. Deripaska, whose business interests have long intersected with the Kremlin’s and who has been called “Putin’s oligarch.”

An internal report noted that Mr. Deripaska had faced numerous allegations, including of money laundering in Spain, an ongoing tax evasion case, using the courts to “bully his competitors,” and having links to organized crime in Russia. Mr. Deripaska did not respond to questions seeking comment but previously said that he had been unfairly targeted for sanctions.

A bank division charged with insulating Deutsche from potential financial crimes raised similar concerns. Given the “frequency and seriousness of adverse information” about Mr. Deripaska, this report recommended “exiting those relationships where Deripaska is the controlling party.”

Elsewhere in the bank, in divisions focused on generating revenue, people offered a completely different take.

“Deutsche Bank has a longstanding business relationship with Mr. Deripaska,” one report read. “He is a reputable businessman and well-established business partner with a significant pipeline of further transactions.”

That argument won out, as it would for years to come.

An internal presentation from 2015 said, “Russian billionaires contribute heavily to our success.” Those well-heeled clients were considered the “backbone of sustainable growth” for the wealth-management division, a profitable segment for the bank.

A chart from that period showed that only four countries had more households than Russia with a net worth of at least $100 million, making it “an attractive market for wealth managers.”

Around that time, Deutsche entered a long period of regulatory and law enforcement challenges. The bank paid billions of dollars to settle allegations that it had manipulated interest rates in London, handled billions of dollars in transactions for clients in countries under U.S. sanctions and contributed to the 2008 financial crisis by pushing toxic mortgages on investors.

One of those cases, the “mirror trading” scandal, focused on Deutsche’s activities in Russia. Regulators in the United States and Britain accused Deutsche of helping Russian investors launder as much as $10 billion. Deutsche paid hundreds of millions of dollars in 2017 to settle the case.

In the aftermath, Deutsche dropped some of its clients and focused instead on the wealthiest Russians, which generally meant oligarchs.

“Russia is and will continue to be one of the most attractive and significant markets for Deutsche Bank in Europe,” said a statement announcing the appointment of Borislav Ivanov as the bank’s top executive in Russia.

As Deutsche embraced oligarchs, ties between the United States and Russia were growing strained.

In 2018, Steven T. Mnuchin, then the U.S. treasury secretary, accused Russia’s government and its oligarchs of fostering “malign activity around the globe.” He cited Russia’s invasion of Ukraine’s Crimea region and its meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The Trump administration placed financial sanctions on seven wealthy industrialists close to Mr. Putin.

Of them, five were Deutsche Bank clients, either personally or through business affiliations, internal records show.

The list included Mr. Deripaska, who remained a client despite earlier reservations. It also named Mr. Vekselberg and the investment company he had founded, Renova Group. Mr. Ackermann, who was by then Deutsche Bank’s chairman, also sat on the board of Renova. (Mr. Vekselberg has said he was unfairly targeted for economic sanctions.)

During a meeting of the Deutsche supervisory board’s risk committee in 2019, one adviser questioned keeping the oligarchs as clients given the increasing risk, according to minutes of the meeting.

“If one of the clients turns out to be bad,” the adviser said, “the loss will be a multiple of the return.”

Deutsche’s regulatory problems pushed open the bank’s doors to outside scrutiny. The bank had been subject to outside monitoring by the United States since the mirror-trading scandal. A 2020 settlement over the bank’s relationship with Jeffrey Epstein, the convicted sex offender, and its connection to a bank involved in a major Russian money laundering scheme extended that oversight. The monitors soon zeroed in on the oligarch clients.

A document from the leaked trove shows that in September 2020, outside lawyers hired by the State of New York recommended that Deutsche Bank “strongly consider” shutting down all “operations and service related to Russia at this time.”

A lawyer representing Deutsche noted in an email to bank executives that the monitor said many other banks had already “exited Russia or significantly downsized Russian operations.”

“Is this accurate?” the lawyer asked. “Are we in line with, ahead of, or behind our peers?”

Mr. Ivanov, Deutsche Bank’s top executive in Russia, took exception, replying that a competitor was still in Russia and “5x our size” in several lines of business.

That claim cannot be verified based on public records. But Deutsche’s records show that its ties to wealthy Russians continued.

In 2018, a Deutsche Bank executive emailed a colleague to say that she had just been in Luxembourg and noticed the bank was “significantly expanding” its Russian clientele there.

She added that when she had met with Luxembourg’s financial regulators, “the first thing they mentioned was their concern related to those Russian clients.”

Deutsche had been quietly moving its oligarch accounts to its offices in Luxembourg and Switzerland, countries with strict bank-secrecy laws. That could give the bank legal cover to deny government requests for client records, though this was never stated as a motivation for the change.

Deutsche Bank, in one of its recent statements to reporters, said it concentrated its wealth-management clients in those locations, not just the Russians, following industry practices. The bank said all its Russian clients were subject to applicable vetting requirements.

In November 2020, a 172-page “Russia Strategy Review” noted that 17 Russian clients were on what was known as the U.S. Treasury Department’s “Kremlin list” of 210 senior government officials and oligarchs. Only a few accounts remained based in Frankfurt, where Deutsche Bank has its headquarters, and they were being moved. It noted Russia’s “elevated” risk for money laundering and sanctions — but also noted “the relevance and profitability of the Russian market.”

An internal review, code-named Project Oak, explored how Deutsche’s correspondent banks in Russia could pull it into problematic transactions involving wealthy clients. Yet spreadsheets attached to internal emails in 2021 showed the bank still planning to expand its oligarch clientele.

One spreadsheet said Deutsche’s relationship with Alfa-Bank, Russia’s largest private commercial bank, was dormant “in principle” because of “technical issues” that “will be solved immediately.”

Regarding several business accounts linked to Mr. Vekselberg, the sheets noted that the bank’s anti-financial-crime division in Switzerland wanted to “exit the whole client relationship.” Employees elsewhere in the bank had concluded “that this is not possible at the moment.”

By then, Mr. Vekselberg had been under U.S. sanctions for years. His $100 million yacht had been seized by the Spanish and U.S. authorities in Mallorca. Mr. Deripaska also remained a client.

Yet again, Deutsche hung on.

In April 2021, Deutsche’s management board unanimously voted to pursue careful growth in Moscow, citing improvements to its internal controls. A draft of a report presented to the board cited the “relevance and profitability of the Russian market.”

“DB remains comfortable with its current presence and business model” in Russia, the draft report noted.

That comfort level quickly dissipated after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

In a flurry of emails, one executive wrote that new sanctions would “have a significant operational impact on DB.” Another wrote that a unit within the bank was now considering “effectively disallowing business with Russian parties.”

The dozen sanction packages that arrived within three days of the war, one executive wrote, had created “unprecedented complexity” and a nearly “unmanageable situation.”

A more worrisome complication lurked, carrying the threat of criminal prosecution.

The year before the full-scale war started, Deutsche signed an agreement with the U.S. Justice Department to avoid prosecution on allegations that it had paid bribes, disguised as consulting agreements, to politically connected figures. The agreement allowed the Justice Department to demand answers from the bank for the next three years about people and companies under sanctions.

Days after the invasion, federal prosecutors invoked the agreement. They sought the names and account balances of Russian clients under sanctions as well as steps the bank was taking to monitor Russian money flows.

An internal bank email said the prosecutors stressed “that the Bank will be closely scrutinized and judged on whether it is responding quickly and accurately.”

Because Deutsche Bank had moved oligarch accounts to countries with strict secrecy laws years earlier, it had legal grounds to refuse to disclose details about those clients. Deutsche “is not permitted to disclose customer data from Switzerland and Luxembourg to the D.O.J. (banking secrecy),” one specialist wrote in an email.

The bank also appears to have withheld details about companies that were less than 50 percent owned by oligarchs under sanctions, as generally allowed by a Treasury Department rule. That appears to have exempted some of Mr. Deripaska’s holdings, among others. (The bank, in its response for this article, did not address what information it provided the Justice Department.)

Prosecutors apparently accepted Deutsche’s responses. The bank said that it fulfilled its obligations under its agreement with the U.S. government. The Justice Department did not respond to requests for comment from the consortium that reported this article.

By March 2022, sentiment in Germany had swung sharply. The government provided weapons to Ukraine, agreed to European sanctions against Russia and halted its undersea gas pipeline from Russia.

On March 10, Christian Sewing, Deutsche’s chief executive, told employees that the bank would end some, but not all, of its Russian business. “We are often asked why we are not withdrawing completely from Russia,” he wrote in an email. “The answer is that this would go against our values. We have clients who cannot exit Russia overnight. And, as far as we can, we will continue to also support them, too, at this difficult time.”

That same day, as public pressure mounted, JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs said they would withdraw from Russia.

Then Mr. Sewing reversed course. The following day, Deutsche announced that it was winding down operations in the country it had long seen as important to its future.

“There won’t be any new business in Russia,” the statement said.

Additional reporting was contributed by Emma Prest, Sophia Stahl, Michael Suntinger, Anna Lauterjung, Maria Theresa Cruz, Karina Shedrofsky, Elizabeth Bratton, Olaf Storbeck, Dan McCrum and Lukas Kotkamp. The investigation was coordinated by Barracuda Media with technical support from the Data and Research Center in Germany.

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