Double standards and destabilization: Why Iran sees itself under siege

As the United States amasses its largest military buildup in the Middle East since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the narrative presented in Western capitals portrays Iran as the primary source of instability. Yet from Tehran’s perspective-and from the vantage point of many across the Global South-the current crisis reflects not Iranian aggression, but decades of coercion, double standards, and external interference led by Washington and backed by Israel.
The deployment of massive American airpower to the region, alongside explicit threats of military action, raises a fundamental question: who is escalating? While U.S. officials demand that Iran dismantle its uranium enrichment program, curb its missile capabilities, and sever ties with regional allies, Iran has consistently argued that its nuclear program is peaceful and within its sovereign rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Enrichment for civilian energy purposes is not prohibited under international law. Yet Iran is uniquely targeted for exercising rights that other signatories retain.
The 2015 nuclear agreement-widely known as the JCPOA-demonstrated that diplomacy could work. Iran reduced its enriched uranium stockpile by 98 percent, dismantled thousands of centrifuges, and subjected itself to one of the most intrusive inspection regimes in modern history. In return, it received sanctions relief that was legally endorsed by the UN Security Council. The International Atomic Energy Agency repeatedly verified Iran’s compliance.
It was not Tehran that abandoned the deal.
In 2018, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA despite Iran’s verified adherence. Sanctions were reimposed with devastating economic consequences for ordinary Iranians-crippling oil exports, collapsing currency values, and driving inflation and unemployment to punishing levels. This “maximum pressure” campaign did not target military elites; it targeted an entire population. From Iran’s perspective, the lesson was stark: even full compliance offers no guarantee against shifting political winds in Washington.
The current U.S. position-that Iran must not only limit its nuclear program but also abandon its missile capabilities and regional alliances-amounts to a demand for unilateral strategic disarmament. No sovereign state would accept such terms lightly, particularly in a region saturated with advanced weaponry supplied by the United States to its allies. Israel, widely understood to possess an undeclared nuclear arsenal, is not a signatory to the NPT and faces no comparable international scrutiny. Yet it has repeatedly conducted unilateral strikes on Iranian targets, including diplomatic facilities and nuclear scientists, actions that Iran considers acts of war.
From Tehran’s vantage point, this is not a neutral enforcement of global norms but a system of selective accountability.
Iran’s support for regional actors such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Palestinian factions is framed by Washington and Tel Aviv as sponsorship of terrorism. Iran, however, portrays these alliances as components of a defensive “axis of resistance” against Israeli occupation and Western intervention. Whether one agrees with that framing or not, it reflects a regional security architecture shaped by decades of war, invasion, and external interference. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, the prolonged conflict in Afghanistan, and repeated Israeli military campaigns in Gaza and Lebanon have left deep scars across the Middle East. Iran argues that its regional posture is a response to this environment-not its cause.
The recent escalation between Israel and Iran further underscores the volatility created by unilateral military action. Israeli strikes on Iranian facilities and personnel were justified as preemptive self-defense. Yet preemption is a doctrine fraught with risk, especially when applied without multilateral authorization. When the United States joined direct attacks on Iranian nuclear sites, it crossed a historic threshold, becoming the first American administration to openly participate in such operations. These actions were framed as deterrence. But deterrence imposed through force alone often breeds retaliation rather than stability.
Iran’s temporary closure of the Strait of Hormuz during military exercises has been widely criticized as a threat to global energy markets. However, Tehran views such maneuvers as signaling mechanisms-responses to the overwhelming military presence surrounding its borders. When aircraft carriers and strategic bombers are deployed nearby, the expectation of passivity from Iran appears unrealistic.
The broader issue is credibility. If diplomatic agreements can be discarded unilaterally, if sanctions are used as instruments of economic warfare, and if military strikes are normalized as policy tools, then trust erodes. In such an environment, calls for Iran to scale back its deterrent capabilities ring hollow.
None of this absolves Iran of responsibility for actions that heighten regional tensions. But meaningful diplomacy requires acknowledging reciprocal obligations. Security cannot be one-sided. Demands that Iran permanently constrain its strategic options while Israel maintains qualitative military superiority and nuclear opacity are unlikely to produce sustainable outcomes.
The path forward lies not in coercive escalation but in restoring a framework of mutual compliance and regional dialogue. A revived nuclear agreement-one that includes enforceable guarantees against unilateral withdrawal-would be a starting point. Broader discussions on missile limits and regional de-escalation must involve all stakeholders, including Israel and Gulf states, rather than singling out one actor.
Military buildup may create leverage, but it also narrows room for compromise. The Middle East has endured too many cycles of confrontation fueled by distrust and power politics. If Washington and Tel Aviv continue to rely primarily on force, they risk validating Tehran’s long-standing claim that resistance-not concession-is the only reliable defense.
In the end, stability will not come from airstrikes or ultimatums. It will come from recognizing that durable security in the region must be collective, reciprocal, and rooted in respect for sovereignty-not imposed through dominance.